Consequentialism
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Consequentialism refers to those moral theories which hold that the consequences of a particular action form the basis for any valid moral judgment about that action (but see rule consequentialism). Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right action is one that produces a good outcome, or consequence.
Consequentialism is usually understood as distinct from deontology, in that deontology derives the rightness or wrongness of an act from the character of the act itself rather than the outcomes of the action, and from virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of the agent rather than on the nature or consequences of the action itself. The difference between these three approaches to morality tends to lie more in the way moral dilemmas are approached than in the moral conclusions reached. For example, a consequentialist may argue that lying is wrong because of the negative consequences produced by lying — though a consequentialist may allow that certain foreseeable consequences might make lying acceptable. A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, regardless of any potential "good" that might come from lying. A virtue ethicist, however, would focus less on lying in any particular instance and instead consider what a decision to tell a lie or not tell a lie said about one's character and moral behavior.
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[edit] Definition
The term "consequentialism" was coined by G.E.M. Anscombe in her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, to describe what she saw as the central error of certain moral theories, such as those propounded by Mill and Sidgwick.[1] Since then, the term has become common in English-language ethical theory.
The defining feature of consequentialist moral theories is the weight given to the consequences in evaluating the rightness and wrongness of actions.[2] In consequentialist theories, the consequences of an action or rule generally outweigh other considerations. Apart from this basic outline, there is little else that can be unequivocally said about consequentialism as such. However, there are some questions that many consequentialist theories address:
- What sort of consequences count as good consequences?
- Who is the primary beneficiary of moral action?
- How are the consequences judged and who judges them?
[edit] Kinds of consequences
One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to hedonistic utilitarianism, a good action is one that results in an increase in pleasure, and the best action is one that results in the most pleasure for the greatest number. Closely related is eudaimonic consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in material equality or political liberty instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally. Whether a particular consequentialist theory focuses on a single good or many, conflicts and tensions between different good states of affairs are to be expected and must be adjudicated.
[edit] Consequences for whom
Moral action always has an effect on certain people or things, the consequences. Various kinds of consequentialism can be differentiated by beneficiary of the good consequences. That is, one might ask "Consequences for whom?"
[edit] Agent-focused or agent-neutral
A fundamental distinction can be drawn between theories that demand that agents act for ends in which they have some personal interest or motivation and theories that demand that agents act for ends perhaps disconnected from their own interests and drives. These are called "agent-focused" and "agent-neutral" theories respectively. Agent-neutral consequentialism ignores the specific value a state of affairs has for any particular agent. Thus, in an agent-neutral theory, an actor's personal goals do not count any more than anyone else's goals in evaluating what action the actor should take. Agent-focused consequentialism, on the other hand, focuses on the particular needs of the moral agent. Thus, in an agent-focused account, such as one that Peter Railton outlines, the actor might be concerned with the general welfare, but the actor is more concerned with the immediate welfare of herself and her friends and family[3]. These two approaches could be reconciled by acknowledging the tension between an agent's interests as an individual and as a member of various groups, and seeking to somehow optimize among all of these interests. For example, it may be meaningful to speak of an action as being good for someone as an individual but bad for them as a citizen of their town.
[edit] Human-centered?
Many consequentialist theories may seem primarily concerned with human beings and their relationships with other human beings. However, some philosophers argue that we should not limit our ethical consideration to the interests of human beings alone. Jeremy Bentham, who is regarded as the founder of Utilitarianism, argues that animals can experience pleasure and pain, thus demanding that 'non-human animals' should be a serious object of moral concern[4]. More recently, Peter Singer has argued that it is unreasonable that we do not give equal consideration to the interests of animals as to those of human beings when we choose the way we are to treat them[5]. Such equal consideration does not necessarily imply identical treatment of humans and non-humans, any more than it necessarily implies identical treatment of all humans.
[edit] Action guidance
One important characteristic of many normative moral theories such as consequentialism is the ability to produce practical moral judgements. At the very least, any moral theory needs to define the standpoint from which the goodness of the consequences are to be determined. What is primarily at stake here is the responsibility of the agent.
[edit] The ideal observer
One common tactic among consequentialists, particularly those committed to an altruistic (selfless) account of consequentialism, is employ an ideal, neutral observer from which moral judgements can be made. John Rawls, a critic of utilitarianism, argues that utilitarianism, in common with other forms of consequentialism, relies on the perspective of such an ideal observer[3]. The particular characteristics of this ideal observer can vary from an omniscient observer, who would grasp all the consequences of any action, to an ideally informed observer, who knows as much as could reasonably be expected, but not necessarily all the circumstances or all the possible consequences. Consequentialist theories that adopt this paradigm hold that right action is the action that will bring about the best consequences from this ideal observer's perspective.
[edit] The real observer
In practice, it is very difficult, and at times arguably impossible, to adopt the point of view of an ideal observer. Individual moral agents do not know everything about their particular situations, and thus do not know all the possible consequences of their potential actions. For this reason, some theorists have argued that consequentialist theories can only require agents to choose the best action in line with what they know about the situation.[2] However, if this approach is naïvely adopted, then moral agents who, for example, recklessly fail to reflect on their situation, and act in a way that brings about terrible results, could be said to be acting in a morally justifiable way. Acting in a situation without first informing oneself of the circumstances of the situation can lead to even the most well-intended actions yielding miserable consequences. As a result, it could be argued that there is a moral imperative for an agent to inform himself as much as possible about a situation before judging the appropriate course of action. This imperative, of course, is derived from consequential thinking: a better informed agent is able to bring about better consequences.
[edit] Varieties of consequentialism
[edit] Utilitarianism
“ |
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think... |
” |
— Jeremy Bentham , The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) Ch I, p 1
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Summarily, Jeremy Bentham states that people are driven by their interests and their fears, but their interests take precedence over their fears, and their interests are carried out in accordance with how people view the consequences that might be involved with their interests. "Happiness" on this account is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain.
Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness; the happiness of everyone and not the happiness of any particular person. John Stuart Mill, in his exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.[6] However, some contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer are concerned to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, hence "preference utilitarianism". Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of consequentialism outlined below.
[edit] Ethical egoism and altruism
Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, egoism may license actions which are good for the agent, but it is generally seen as detrimental to general welfare. Some like Henry Sidgwick, however, argue that a certain degree of egoism promotes general welfare for two reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.[7]
Ethical altruism can be seen as a consequentialist ethic which prescribes that an individual take actions that have the best consequences for everyone except for himself.[8] This was advocated by Auguste Comte, who coined the term "altruism," and whose ethics can be summed up in the phrase: Live for others.[9]
[edit] Rule consequentialism
In general, consequentialist theories focus on actions. However, this need not be the case. Rule consequentialism is a theory that is sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile deontology and consequentialism - and in some cases, this is stated as a criticism of rule consequentialism [10]. Like deontology, rule consequentialism holds that moral behavior involves following certain rules. However, rule consequentialism chooses rules based on the consequences that the selection of those rules have.
Various theorists are split as to whether the rules are the only determinant of moral behavior or not. For example, Robert Nozick holds that a certain set of minimal rules, which he calls "side-constraints", are necessary to ensure appropriate actions.[3] There are also differences as to how absolute these moral rules are. Thus, while Nozick's side-constraints are absolute restrictions on behavior, Amartya Sen proposes a theory which recognizes the importance of certain rules, but these rules are not absolute.[3] That is, they may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences.
One of the most common objections to rule-consequentialism is that it is incoherent, because it is based on the consequentialist pricniple that what we should be concerned with is maximising the good, but then it tells us not to act to maximise the good, but to follow rules (even in cases where we know that breaking the rule could produce better results).
Brad Hooker avoided this objection by not basing his form of rule-consequentialism on the ideal of maximising the good. He writes:
"…the best argument for rule-consequentialism is not that it derives from an overarching commitment to maximise the good. The best argument for rule-consequentialism is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions, as well as offering us help with our moral disagreements and uncertainties" [11]
Derek Parfit described Brad Hooker's book on rule-consequentialism Ideal Code, Real World as the "best statement and defence, so far, of one of the most important moral theories." [12]
Rule consequentialism exists in the forms of rule utilitarianism and rule egoism.
[edit] Negative consequentialism
Most consequentialist theories focus on promoting some sort of good consequences. However, one could equally well lay out a consequentialist theory that focuses solely on minimizing bad consequences. (Negative utilitarianism is an actual example.) Of course, the maximization of good consequences could also involve the minimization of bad consequences, but the promotion of good consequences is usually of primary import.
One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism may only require that we avoid bad ones. A more strenuous version of negative consequentialism may actually require active intervention, but only to prevent harm from being done. An alternative theory (using the example of negative utilitarianism) is that some consider the reduction of suffering (for the disadvantaged) to be more valuable than increased pleasure (for the affluent or luxurious).
[edit] Consequentialism and other moral theories
[edit] Deontology
Consequentialism is often contrasted with deontological moral theories. Deontological theories hold that we have a duty to perform or refrain from certain types of actions and that this duty derives from the nature of the act itself, rather than from the consequences produced by the action. Consequently, a deontologist might argue that we should stick to our duty regardless of the consequences. For example, Kant famously argued that we have a moral duty to always tell the truth, even to a murderer who asks where the would-be victim is.
However, consequentialist and deontological theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, T.M. Scanlon advances the idea that human rights, which are commonly considered a "deontological" concept, can only be justified with reference to the consequences of having those rights[3]. Similarly, Robert Nozick argues for a theory that is mostly consequentialist, but incorporates inviolable "side-constraints" which restrict the sort of actions agents are permitted to do[3].
[edit] Virtue ethics
Consequentialism can also be contrasted with aretaic moral theories such as virtue ethics. Whereas consequentialist theories posit that consequences of action should be the primary focus of our thinking about ethics, virtue ethics insists that it is the character rather than the consequences of actions that should be the focal point. Some virtue ethicists hold that consequentialist theories totally disregard the development and importance of moral character. For example, Philippa Foot argues that consequences in themselves have no ethical content, unless it has been provided by a virtue such as benevolence[3].
However, consequentialism and virtue ethics need not be understood to be entirely antagonistic. Consequentialist theories can consider character in several ways. For example, the effects on the character of the agent or any other people involved in an action may be regarded as a relevant consequence. Similarly, a consequentialist theory may aim at the maximization of a particular virtue or set of virtues. Finally, following Foot's lead, one might adopt a sort of consequentialism which argues that virtuous activity ultimately produces the best consequences.
[edit] Criticisms of consequentialism
[edit] General criticisms
William Gass argues that moral theories such as consequentialism are unable to adequately explain why a morally wrong action is morally wrong. Gass uses the example of an "obliging stranger" who agrees to be baked in an oven. Gass claims that the rationale that any moral theory might attempt to give for this wrongness, e.g. it does not bring about good results, is simply absurd. According to Gass, it is wrong to bake a stranger, however obliging, and nothing more can or need be said about it[13].
G. E. M. Anscombe, whose previously mentioned paper coined the term "consequentialism"[1], objects to consequentialism on the grounds that it does not provide guidance in what one ought to do, since the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined based on the consequences it produces. Furthermore, she argues that consequentialism since Henry Sidgwick denies that there is any distinction between consequences that are foreseen and those that are intended (see Principle of double effect). Finally, Anscombe objects to the very character of consequentialism itself insofar as it is concerned with determining the rightness and wrongness of actions. She argues that the distinction between right action and wrong action only makes sense within the framework of Judeo-Christian divine law—and, according to Anscombe, Judeo-Christian divine law is incompatible with consequentialism.
[edit] Character-based criticisms
Bernard Williams has argued that consequentialism is alienating because it requires moral agents to put too much distance between themselves and their own projects and commitments. Williams argues that consequentialism requires moral agents to take a strictly impersonal view of all actions, since it is only the consequences, and not who produces them, that is said to matter. Williams argues that this demands too much of moral agents — since (he claims) consequentialism demands that they be willing to sacrifice any and all personal projects and commitments in any given circumstance in order to pursue the most beneficent course of action possible. He argues further that consequentialism fails to make sense of intuitions that it can matter whether or not someone is personally the author of a particular consequence. For example, that having "dirty hands" by participating in a crime can matter, even if the crime would have been committed anyway, or would even have been worse, without the agent's participation.
Some consequentialists — most notably Peter Railton — have attempted to develop a form of consequentialism that acknowledges and avoids the objections raised by Williams. Railton argues that Williams's criticisms can be avoided by adopting a form of consequentialism in which moral decisions are to be determined by the sort of life that they express. On his account, the agent should choose the sort of life that will, on the whole, produce the best overall effects[3].
However, more recently, there have been attacks upon consequentialism in a similar vein. For example, Thomas Nagel holds that consequentialism fails to appropriately take into account the people affected by a particular action. He argues that a consequentialist cannot really criticize human rights abuses in a war, for example, if they ultimately result in a better state of affairs[3].
[edit] Applications of Consequentialist Theory
Consequentialist theory has a number of potential applications. For instance, Richard Mullender sees consequentialist theory as providing a rationale and foundation for a new understanding of social democracy. [14] James Page sees consequentialist theory as providing a rationale and foundation for peace education. [15]
[edit] Notable consequentialists
- Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), whose book The Prince argues that rulers must be consequentialists
- Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746)
- Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
- William Godwin (1756-1836)
- James Mill (1773-1836)
- John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
- Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900)
- G.E. Moore (1873-1958)
- Richard B. Brandt (1910-1997)
- R.M. Hare (1919-2002)
- John Harsanyi (1920-2000)
- J. J. C. Smart (born 1920)
- Henry Kissinger (born 1923)
- Amartya Sen (born 1933)
- R. M. Adams (born 1937)
- Philip Pettit (born 1945)
- Peter Singer (born 1946)
- Shelly Kagan
- Peter Railton (born 1950)
- Brad Hooker
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- ^ a b "Modern Moral Philosophy". Philosophy 33: 1–19. http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/cmt/mmp.html.
- ^ a b Mackie, J. L.. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-013558-8.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Scheffler, Samuel (Ed.) (1988). Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875073-4.
- ^ Bentham, Jeremy (1996). An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820516-6. http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.toc.html.
- ^ Singer, Peter (2002). Helga Kuhse, ed.. ed. Unsanctifying Human Life. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-22507-2.
- ^ Mill, John Stuart (1998). Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-875163-2. http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm.
- ^ Sidgwick, Henry (1907). The Method of Ethics. NY: Dover (1981). ISBN 0915145286. http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/.
- ^ "Ethics" by James Fisher and Bradley Dowdwen, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [1]
- ^ Moran, Gabriel Christian Religion and National Interests
- ^ Bernard Williams, "Utilitarianism" in his Morality, Cambridge University Press 1993
- ^ Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 101.
- ^ Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World Oxford University Press, new edition 2002, back cover [2]
- ^ Gass, William H. (1957). "The Case of the Obliging Stranger". The Philosophical Review 66: 193–204. doi: .
- ^ Mullender, Richard (2000) 'Theorizing the Third Way: Qualified Consequentialism, the Proportionalty Principle and the New Social Democracy', Journal of Law and Society 27(4):493-516.
- ^ Page, James S. (2008) Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations. Charlotte: Information Age Publishing. ISBN 978-1-59311-889-1. [3][4]
[edit] Further reading
- Darwall, Stephen (Ed.) (2002). Consequentialism. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-23108-0.
- Honderich, Ted (2003). Consequentialism, Moralities of Concern and Selfishness. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ted9.htm.
- Scheffler, Samuel (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-823511-8.
[edit] External links
- Consequentialism entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- Rule Consequentialism entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Brad Hooker
- Utiliarianism resources
- Felicifia. Currently the web's only consequentialism forum (with a focus on utilitarianism).