Firewall
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A firewall is an integrated collection of security measures designed to prevent unauthorized electronic access to a networked computer system. It is also a device or set of devices configured to permit, deny, encrypt, decrypt, or proxy all computer traffic between different security domains based upon a set of rules and other criteria.
Firewalls can be implemented in both hardware and software, or a combination of both. Firewalls are frequently used to prevent unauthorized Internet users from accessing private networks connected to the Internet, especially intranets. All messages entering or leaving the intranet pass through the firewall, which examines each message and blocks those that do not meet the specified security criteria.
There are several types of firewall techniques:
- Packet filter: Looks at each packet entering or leaving the network and accepts or rejects it based on user-defined rules. Packet filtering is fairly effective and transparent to users, but it is difficult to configure. In addition, it is susceptible to IP spoofing.
- Application gateway: Applies security mechanisms to specific applications, such as FTP and Telnet servers. This is very effective, but can impose a performance degradation.
- Circuit-level gateway: Applies security mechanisms when a TCP or UDP connection is established. Once the connection has been made, packets can flow between the hosts without further checking.
- Proxy server: Intercepts all messages entering and leaving the network. The proxy server effectively hides the true network addresses.
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[edit] Function
A firewall is a dedicated appliance, or software running on computer, which inspects network traffic passing through it, and denies or permits passage based on a set of rules.
A firewall's basic task is to regulate some of the flow of traffic between computer networks of different trust levels. Typical examples are the Internet which is a zone with no trust and an internal network which is a zone of higher trust. A zone with an intermediate trust level, situated between the Internet and a trusted internal network, is often referred to as a "perimeter network" or Demilitarized zone (DMZ).
A firewall's function within a network is similar to physical firewalls with fire doors in building construction. In the former case, it is used to prevent network intrusion to the private network. In the latter case, it is intended to contain and delay structural fire from spreading to adjacent structures.
Without proper configuration, a firewall can often become worthless. Standard security practices dictate a "default-deny" firewall ruleset, in which the only network connections which are allowed are the ones that have been explicitly allowed. Unfortunately, such a configuration requires detailed understanding of the network applications and endpoints required for the organization's day-to-day operation. Many businesses lack such understanding, and therefore implement a "default-allow" ruleset, in which all traffic is allowed unless it has been specifically blocked. This configuration makes inadvertent network connections and system compromise much more likely.
[edit] History
The term "firewall" originally meant a wall to confine a fire or potential fire within a building, c.f. firewall (construction). Later uses refer to similar structures, such as the metal sheet separating the engine compartment of a vehicle or aircraft from the passenger compartment.
Firewall technology emerged in the late 1980s when the Internet was a fairly new technology in terms of its global use and connectivity. The predecessors to firewalls for network security were the routers used in the late 1980s to separate networks from one another.[1] The view of the Internet as a relatively small community of compatible users who valued openness for sharing and collaboration was ended by a number of major internet security breaches, which occurred in the late 1980s:[1]
- Clifford Stoll's discovery of German spies tampering with his system[1]
- Bill Cheswick's "Evening with Berferd" 1992 in which he set up a simple electronic jail to observe an attacker[1]
- In 1988 an employee at the NASA Ames Research Center in California sent a memo by email to his colleagues [2]that read,
| “ | We are currently under attack from an Internet VIRUS! It has hit Berkeley, UC San Diego, Lawrence Livermore, Stanford, and NASA Ames. | ” |
- The Morris Worm spread itself through multiple vulnerabilities in the machines of the time. Although it was not malicious in intent, the Morris Worm was the first large scale attack on Internet security; the online community was neither expecting an attack nor prepared to deal with one.[3]
[edit] First generation - packet filters
The first paper published on firewall technology was in 1988, when engineers from Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) developed filter systems known as packet filter firewalls. This fairly basic system was the first generation of what would become a highly evolved and technical internet security feature. At AT&T Bell Labs, Bill Cheswick and Steve Bellovin were continuing their research in packet filtering and developed a working model for their own company based upon their original first generation architecture.
Packet filters act by inspecting the "packets" which represent the basic unit of data transfer between computers on the Internet. If a packet matches the packet filter's set of rules, the packet filter will drop (silently discard) the packet, or reject it (discard it, and send "error responses" to the source).
This type of packet filtering pays no attention to whether a packet is part of an existing stream of traffic (it stores no information on connection "state"). Instead, it filters each packet based only on information contained in the packet itself (most commonly using a combination of the packet's source and destination address, its protocol, and, for TCP and UDP traffic, the port number).
TCP and UDP protocols comprise most communication over the Internet, and because TCP and UDP traffic by convention uses well known ports for particular types of traffic, a "stateless" packet filter can distinguish between, and thus control, those types of traffic (such as web browsing, remote printing, email transmission, file transfer), unless the machines on each side of the packet filter are both using the same non-standard ports.
[edit] Second generation - "stateful" filters
From 1989-1990 three colleagues from AT&T Bell Laboratories, Dave Presetto, Janardan Sharma, and Kshitij Nigam developed the second generation of firewalls, calling them circuit level firewalls.
Second(2nd) Generation firewalls in addition regard placement of each individual packet within the packet series. This technology is generally referred to as a stateful packet inspection as it maintains records of all connections passing through the firewall and is able to determine whether a packet is either the start of a new connection, a part of an existing connection, or is an invalid packet. Though there is still a set of static rules in such a firewall, the state of a connection can in itself be one of the criteria which trigger specific rules.
This type of firewall can help prevent attacks which exploit existing connections, or certain Denial-of-service attacks.
[edit] Third generation - application layer
Publications by Gene Spafford of Purdue University, Bill Cheswick at AT&T Laboratories, and Marcus Ranum described a third generation firewall known as an application layer firewall, also known as a proxy-based firewall. Marcus Ranum's work on the technology spearheaded the creation of the first commercial product. The product was released by DEC who named it the DEC SEAL product. DEC’s first major sale was on June 13, 1991 to a chemical company based on the East Coast of the USA.
TIS, under a broader DARPA contract, developed the Firewall Toolkit (FWTK), and made it freely available under license on October 1, 1993. The purposes for releasing the freely-available, not for commercial use, FWTK were: to demonstrate, via the software, documentation, and methods used, how a company with (at the time) 11 years' experience in formal security methods, and individuals with firewall experience, developed firewall software; to create a common base of very good firewall software for others to build on (so people did not have to continue to "roll their own" from scratch); and to "raise the bar" of firewall software being used.
The key benefit of application layer filtering is that it can "understand" certain applications and protocols (such as File Transfer Protocol, DNS, or web browsing), and it can detect whether an unwanted protocol is being sneaked through on a non-standard port or whether a protocol is being abused in any harmful way.
[edit] Subsequent developments
In 1992, Bob Braden and Annette DeSchon at the University of Southern California (USC) were refining the concept of a firewall. The product known as "Visas" was the first system to have a visual integration interface with colours and icons, which could be easily implemented to and accessed on a computer operating system such as Microsoft's Windows or Apple's MacOS. In 1994 an Israeli company called Check Point Software Technologies built this into readily available software known as FireWall-1.
The existing deep packet inspection functionality of modern firewalls can be shared by Intrusion-prevention systems (IPS).
Currently, the Middlebox Communication Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is working on standardizing protocols for managing firewalls and other middleboxes.
Another axis of development is about integrating identity of users into Firewall rules. Many firewalls provide such features by binding user identities to IP or MAC addresses, which is very approximate and can be easily turned around. The NuFW firewall provides real identity based firewalling, by requesting user's signature for each connection.
[edit] Types
There are several classifications of firewalls depending on where the communication is taking place, where the communication is intercepted and the state that is being traced.
[edit] Network layer and packet filters
Network layer firewalls, also called packet filters, operate at a relatively low level of the TCP/IP protocol stack, not allowing packets to pass through the firewall unless they match the established rule set. The firewall administrator may define the rules; or default rules may apply. The term "packet filter" originated in the context of BSD operating systems.
Network layer firewalls generally fall into two sub-categories, stateful and stateless. Stateful firewalls maintain context about active sessions, and use that "state information" to speed packet processing. Any existing network connection can be described by several properties, including source and destination IP address, UDP or TCP ports, and the current stage of the connection's lifetime (including session initiation, handshaking, data transfer, or completion connection). If a packet does not match an existing connection, it will be evaluated according to the ruleset for new connections. If a packet matches an existing connection based on comparison with the firewall's state table, it will be allowed to pass without further processing.
Stateless firewalls require less memory, and can be faster for simple filters that require less time to filter than to look up a session. They may also be necessary for filtering stateless network protocols that have no concept of a session. However, they cannot make more complex decisions based on what stage communications between hosts have reached.
Modern firewalls can filter traffic based on many packet attributes like source IP address, source port, destination IP address or port, destination service like WWW or FTP. They can filter based on protocols, TTL values, netblock of originator, domain name of the source, and many other attributes.
Commonly used packet filters on various versions of Unix are ipf (various), ipfw (FreeBSD/Mac OS X), pf (OpenBSD, and all other BSDs), iptables/ipchains (Linux).
[edit] Example of some basic firewall rules
Examples using a subnet address of 10.10.10.x and 255.255.255.0 as the subnet mask for the local area network (LAN).
It is common to allow a response to a request for information coming from a computer inside the local network, like NetBIOS.
Direction Protocol Source Address Source Port Destination Address Destination Port Action In/Out Tcp/Udp Any Any 10.10.10.0 >1023 Allow
Firewall rule that allows all traffic out.
Direction Protocol Source Address Source Port Destination Address Destination Port Action Out Tcp/Udp 10.10.10.0 Any Any Any Allow
Firewall rule for SMTP (default port 25), allows packets governed by this protocol to access the local SMTP Gateway (which in this example has the IP 10.10.10.6). (it is far more common to not specify the Destination Address, or if desired, to use the ISP SMTP service address).
Direction Protocol Source Address Source Port Destination Address Destination Port Action Out Tcp Any Any 10.10.10.6 25 Allow
General Rule for the final firewall entry. If a policy does not explicitly allow a request for service, that service should be denied by this catch-all rule which should be the last in the list of rules.
Direction Protocol Source Address Source Port Destination Address Destination Port Action In/Out Tcp/Udp Any Any Any Any Deny
Other useful rules would be allowing ICMP error messages, restricting all destination ports except port 80 in order to allow only web browsing, etc.
[edit] Application-layer
Application-layer firewalls work on the application level of the TCP/IP stack (i.e., all browser traffic, or all telnet or ftp traffic), and may intercept all packets traveling to or from an application. They block other packets (usually dropping them without acknowledgment to the sender). In principle, application firewalls can prevent all unwanted outside traffic from reaching protected machines.
On inspecting all packets for improper content, firewalls can restrict or prevent outright the spread of networked computer worms and trojans. In practice, however, this becomes so complex and so difficult to attempt (given the variety of applications and the diversity of content each may allow in its packet traffic) that comprehensive firewall design does not generally attempt this approach.
The XML firewall exemplifies a more recent kind of application-layer firewall.
[edit] Proxies
A proxy device (running either on dedicated hardware or as software on a general-purpose machine) may act as a firewall by responding to input packets (connection requests, for example) in the manner of an application, whilst blocking other packets.
Proxies make tampering with an internal system from the external network more difficult and misuse of one internal system would not necessarily cause a security breach exploitable from outside the firewall (as long as the application proxy remains intact and properly configured). Conversely, intruders may hijack a publicly-reachable system and use it as a proxy for their own purposes; the proxy then masquerades as that system to other internal machines. While use of internal address spaces enhances security, crackers may still employ methods such as IP spoofing to attempt to pass packets to a target network.
[edit] Network address translation
Firewalls often have network address translation (NAT) functionality, and the hosts protected behind a firewall commonly have addresses in the "private address range", as defined in RFC 1918. Firewalls often have such functionality to hide the true address of protected hosts. Originally, the NAT function was developed to address the limited number of IPv4 routable addresses that could be used or assigned to companies or individuals as well as reduce both the amount and therefore cost of obtaining enough public addresses for every computer in an organization. Hiding the addresses of protected devices has become an increasingly important defense against network reconnaissance.
[edit] See also
- Access control list
- Bastion host
- Comparison of firewalls
- Computer security
- End-to-end connectivity
- Firewall pinhole
- List of Linux router or firewall distributions
- network reconnaissance
- Personal firewall
- Golden Shield Project (aka Great Firewall of China)
- Unified threat management
- Screened-subnet firewall
- Mangled packet
- Comodo Firewall Pro
[edit] References
- ^ a b c d A History and Survey of Network Firewalls Kenneth Ingham and Stephanie Forrest
- ^ [1] Firewalls by Dr.Talal Alkharobi
- ^ RFC 1135 The Helminthiasis of the Internet
[edit] External links
- Internet Firewalls: Frequently Asked Questions, compiled by Matt Curtin, Marcus Ranum and Paul Robertson.
- Internet Security Presentations about online firewalls, anti-virus, spyware, DNS, Wi-Fi and more
- Evolution of the Firewall Industry - Discusses different architectures and their differences, how packets are processed, and provides a timeline of the evolution.
- A History and Survey of Network Firewalls - provides an overview of firewalls at the various ISO levels, with references to the original papers where first firewall work was reported.
- Software Firewalls: Made of Straw? Part 1 of 2 and Software Firewalls: Made of Straw? Part 2 of 2 - a technical view on software firewall design and potential weaknesses
- windowsecurity.com Types of Firewalls article
- Comodo Firewall Whitepaper
- Comprehensive Firewall Portals
