Vela Incident

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Orthographic projection centered on the Prince Edward Islands, the location of the Vela incident

The Vela Incident (sometimes referred to as the South Atlantic Flash) was an unidentified double flash of light detected by a United States Vela satellite on September 22, 1979. Specialists who examined the data speculated that the double flash, characteristic of a nuclear explosion, may have been the result of a nuclear weapons test: "The conclusions of the presidential panel (the Ad Hoc Panel) were reassuring, as they suggested that the most likely explanation of the Vela detection was a meteoroid hitting the satellite — in part because of the discrepancy in bhangmeter readings. Others who examined the data, including DIA, the national laboratories, and contractors reached a very different conclusion — that the data supported the conclusion that on September 22, 1979 Vela 6911 had detected a nuclear detonation."[1][2]

Contents

[edit] Detection

The flash was detected on 22 September 1979, at 00:53 GMT, by US Vela satellite 6911, which carried various sensors designed specifically to detect nuclear explosions. In addition to being able to detect gamma rays, x-rays and neutrons, the satellite also contained two bhangmeter sensors which were able to detect the dual light flashes associated with a nuclear explosion, specifically the initial brief, intense flash as well as the second longer flash that followed.[2]

The satellite reported the characteristic double flash of an atmospheric nuclear explosion of two to three kilotons, in the Indian Ocean between Bouvet Island (a Norwegian dependency) and the Prince Edward Islands (South African dependencies) at 47°S 40°E / 47°S 40°E / -47; 40Coordinates: 47°S 40°E / 47°S 40°E / -47; 40. It should be noted that the explosion of some meteors as they are entering the atmosphere can produce energy measured from kilotons (Eastern Mediterranean Event) to megatons (Tunguska Event). However, the mechanism is different, and meteors do not produce the double flash characteristic of a nuclear detonation.[citation needed]

Vela-5A/B Satellites in Clean Room. The two satellites are separated after launch.

There is much doubt[3] as to whether the satellite's observations were accurate. Vela 6911 was one of a pair launched on 23 May 1969, more than ten years prior to the event, and the satellite was already two years past its design lifespan. It was known to have a failed electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sensor and had developed a fault (in July 1972) in its recording memory, but the fault had cleared itself by March 1978.

Initial assessment by the U.S. National Security Council in October 1979[4] was that the intelligence community had "high confidence" that the event was a low-yield nuclear explosion, although no radioactive debris was detected, and there was "no corroborating seismic or hydro-acoustic data."[4] A later NSC report revised this to "a position of agnosticism" about whether a test had occurred.[5] They concluded that responsibility should be ascribed to South Africa.[4][5]. Later, the Carter administration asked the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to convene a panel of instrumentation experts to examine the Vela 6911 data and determine whether the optical flash detected was from a nuclear test.

United States Air Force WC-135B aircraft flew 25 sorties in the area soon after, but failed to detect any sign of radiation.[6] However low levels of iodine-131 (a short-lived radioactive fission product) were detected in the thyroids of sheep in the states of Victoria and Tasmania in Australia soon after the event. Studies of wind patterns confirmed that fall-out from an explosion in the southern Indian Ocean could have been carried there.[7]

The Arecibo radio telescope in Puerto Rico detected an anomalous ionospheric wave in the morning of 22 September 1979, moving southeast to northwest, unwitnessed before by scientists.[8]

[edit] Office of Science and Technology Evaluation

An independent panel of experts was commissioned by Frank Press, who was the Science Advisor to the President and chair of the OSTP, to evaluate the evidence and determine the likelihood that the event was a nuclear detonation. This panel was chaired by Professor Jack Ruina of MIT, the former director of the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Reporting in the summer of 1980, the panel noted that there were some key differences in the detected optical signature from an actual nuclear explosion, particularly in the ratio of intensities measured by the two detectors on the satellite and that, although the brightness of the flash was explainable only if the flash had occurred in a cloud-free region, the lack of any nuclear debris found by 25 aircraft overflights could be explained only by a detonation in a heavily overcast site. "Based on our experience in related scientific assessments," it was their collective judgement that the signal was spurious. The panel's conclusion was that the signal "was probably not from a nuclear explosion, although we cannot rule out that this signal was of nuclear origin." The now-declassified report[1] contains details of the measurements made by the Vela satellite. The panel was not able to conclude definitively the origin of the event. The best analysis that they could do of the data suggested that, if the sensors were properly calibrated, the event was about 30 meters away from the satellite (and hence was a small event close up, not a big event far away). This was consistent with the hypothesis that a micrometeoroid had impacted the satellite, ejecting a small cloud of debris into space, which reflected sunlight into the sensors.

The fact that the explosion was picked up by only one of the two Vela satellites seems to support the panel's assertion. The Vela satellites had previously detected 41 atmospheric tests, each of which was subsequently confirmed by other means. The absence of corroboration of a nuclear origin for the Vela Incident also suggests that the signal was spurious.

Some, however, cast doubt on the panel's findings, arguing that they were politically motivated.[9] Evidence to corroborate the nuclear hypothesis has been gathered. There was some data that seemed to confirm that a nuclear explosion was the source for the signal. The radio telescope at Arecibo, Puerto Rico, also detected an anomalous traveling ionospheric disturbance at the same time.[9] A test in Western Australia conducted a few months later found increased radiation levels.[10] However a detailed study done by the New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory found no such evidence as did a U.S. government laboratory.[11] The Los Alamos scientists who worked on the Vela program remain convinced that their satellite worked properly.[9]

[edit] Likely responsibility

If a nuclear explosion did occur, it occurred within the 3,000 miles (4,800 km) wide circle covering the Indian Ocean, South Atlantic, southern tip of Africa, and a small part of Antarctica.[12]

[edit] South Africa

South Africa did have a nuclear weapons program at the time, and it falls within that geographic location. Nevertheless, since the fall of apartheid, South Africa has disclosed most of the information on its nuclear weapons program, and according to the subsequent International Atomic Energy Agency report, South Africa could not have constructed such a device until November 1979, two months after the incident. Furthermore the IAEA reported that all South African nuclear devices had been accounted for. A report dated 21 January 1980 prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concluded that:[13]

"In sum, State/INR finds the arguments that South African conducted a nuclear test on 22 September inconclusive, even though, if a nuclear explosion occurred on that date, South Africa is the most likely candidate for responsibility."

[edit] Israel

Well before the Vela Incident, US intelligence had assessed that Israel had nuclear weapons.[14] In the 2008 book “The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation” Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman stated that the flash was the result of a joint South African-Israel nuclear test.[15]

[edit] India

India had carried out a nuclear test in 1974 (see Smiling Buddha). The possibility that India would test a weapon was considered, since it would be normal for the Indian Navy to operate in those waters, but dismissed as impracticable and unnecessary.[16] India was not considered as a potential partner of South Africa's nuclear program as it was one of the most vocal critics of the racist apartheid regime in Pretoria and maintained diplomatic and military sanctions on South Africa.

[edit] Other

U.S. analysts also considered the possibility that it could have been a covert test by a known nuclear state. They concluded that there would be little motivation for the USSR or China in particular to test a nuclear weapon in such a way, unless they were attempting to make it look like South Africa or Israel were covertly testing weapons. As the flash could have occurred in the vicinity of the Kerguelen Islands, it is possible that France was testing a neutron bomb.[12]

It is unlikely any other declared nuclear powers would have conducted such a test. They had little reason to conduct an atmospheric test, and the small size of the blast might reflect a less advanced weapon – though there are many "advanced" reasons for small tests as well, including tactical nuclear weapons (such as neutron bombs) and testing the primary devices for thermonuclear weapons.[citation needed]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 introduced a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, also requiring all States to refrain from "any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons".[17] This prohibition could explain why other countries are so reluctant to admit involvement with South Africa's nuclear weapons program.[original research?]

[edit] Subsequent developments

Since 1980 some new information has emerged. However, most questions remain unanswered:

  • In October 1984, a National Intelligence Estimate on the South African nuclear program noted:

    "There is still considerable disagreement within the Intelligence Community as to whether the flash in the South Atlantic detected by a US [...] satellite in September 1979 was a nuclear test, and if so, by South Africa. If the latter, the need for South Africa to test a device during the time frame of this Estimate is significantly diminished."[18]

    A shorter form of this wording was used in a subsequent National Intelligence Council memorandum of September, 1985.[19]
  • In February 1994 Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, a convicted Soviet spy and commander of South Africa's Simon's Town naval base at the time, talked about the incident upon his release from prison. He said:

    "Although I was not directly involved in planning or carrying out the operation, I learned unofficially that the flash was produced by an Israeli-South African test, code-named Operation Phenix. The explosion was clean and was not supposed to be detected. But they were not as smart as they thought, and the weather changed – so the Americans were able to pick it up."[20] This would hint to a Neutron bomb, which has a low explosive yield, but has a high destructive power on biological material due to ionizing radiation.

    Gerhardt further expressed that no South African naval vessels had been involved, and that he had no first hand knowledge of a test.
  • On April 20, 1997, the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, quoted South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad as confirming that the flash over the Indian Ocean was indeed from a South African nuclear test. Haaretz also cited past reports that Israel purchased 550 tons of uranium from South Africa for its own nuclear plant in Dimona. In exchange, Israel supplied South Africa with nuclear know-how and material to increase the power of nuclear warheads [21] This statement was confirmed by the American Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa [22], but Pahad's press secretary told that Pahad had said only that "there was a strong rumor that a test had taken place, and that it should be investigated". In other words - he was merely repeating the rumours that had been circulating for years.[23]


  • In October 1999, a white paper published by the US Senate Republican Policy Committee in opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty said:

    "There remains uncertainty about whether the South Atlantic flash in September 1979 recorded by optical sensors on the U.S. Vela satellite was a nuclear detonation and, if so, to whom it belonged."[24]

  • In his 2006 book On the Brink, retired CIA clandestine service officer Tyler Drumheller wrote of his 1983-1988 tour in South Africa:

    "We had operational successes, most importantly regarding Pretoria's nuclear capability. My sources collectively provided incontrovertible evidence that the apartheid government had in fact tested a nuclear bomb in the south Atlantic in 1979, and that they had developed a delivery system with assistance from the Israelis."

Some related U.S. information has recently been declassified in the form of heavily redacted reports and memoranda following applications made under Freedom of Information Act. On May 5, 2006, many of these declassified documents were made available through the National Security Archive.

[edit] See also

[edit] Fiction

  • The Vela Incident formed the basis for a novel by Abe Ariel entitled "The Last War". The novel describes the test of an Israeli neutron bomb on an uncharted island.
  • The Vela Incident was probably the inspiration for a Season 5 episode of The West Wing, "The Warfare of Genghis Khan".
  • The Vela Incident is the basis of a 2005 novel by Scott E. Douglas, "Moby and Ahab on a Plutonium Sea".

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b Ad hoc Panel Report on the September 22 Event, Frank Ruina, chair, May 23, 1980. (PDF of report released by FOIA request)
  2. ^ a b Jeffrey Richelson (May 5, 2006). "The Vela Incident: Nuclear Test or Meteoroid?". National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/index.htm. Retrieved on 2008-08-25. 
  3. ^ Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).
  4. ^ a b c NSC memo dated October 22 1979 PDF file
  5. ^ a b NSC memo dated Jan. 7, 1980 PDF
  6. ^ "History of the Air Force Technical Applications Centre, Patrick Airforce Base, Florida: Volume 1" (PDF). United States Airforce via National Security Archive. 2006-05-04. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/15.pdf. Retrieved on 2008-08-25. 
  7. ^ Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1989, ISBN 1-85043-078-0.
  8. ^ David Albright, 'The Flash in the Atlantic', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, pp. 42
  9. ^ a b c Victor Gilinsky (former Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) (May 13, 2004). "Israel's Bomb". The New York Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17104. Retrieved on 2007-12-08. 
  10. ^ Frank Barnaby. 1989. The Invisible Bomb, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., ISBN 1-85043-078-0
  11. ^ Richelson, page 289
  12. ^ a b Richelson Op. Cit, page 296.
  13. ^ The 22 September 1979 Event, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, National Security Archive, December 1979, pp. 11 (paragraph 41), MORI DocID: 1108245, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/03.pdf, retrieved on 2006-11-01 
  14. ^ Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Special National Intelligence Estimate, CIA, 23 August 1974, SNIE 4-1-74, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf, retrieved on 2008-01-20 
  15. ^ Hidden Travels of the Atomic Bomb Book Review New York Times December 8, 2008
  16. ^ Richelson Op. Cit, chapter seven, "The Double Flash".
  17. ^ UNSCR 418 of 4 November 1977: States should refrain from "any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons"
  18. ^ Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies and Programs
  19. ^ The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints
  20. ^ David Albright, 'South Africa and the affordable bomb', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994.
  21. ^ Associated Press, archived at nuclearweaponarchive.org
  22. ^ http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/israel/nuke-test.htm
  23. ^ Albuquerque Journal, 11 July, archived at nuclearweaponarchive.org
  24. ^ Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Cannot Be Verified
  • Aviation Week & Space Technology/July 21, 1997 page 33 "Admission of 1979 Nuclear Test Finally Validates Vela Data" by William B. Scott/Colorado Springs

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